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Abstract This paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of ethanol production on
land use, deforestation and food production. A partial equilibrium model of a national econ-
omy with two sectors and two regions, one of which includes a forest, is developed. It anal-
yses how an exogenous increase in the ethanol price affects input allocation (land and labor)
between sectors (energy crop and food). The total effect of ethanol prices on food production
and deforestation is decomposed into three partial effects. First, the well-documented effect
of direct land competition between rival uses arises; it increases deforestation and decreases
food production. Second, an indirect displacement of food production across regions, possi-
bly provoked by the reaction of international food prices, increases deforestation and reduces
the food sector’s output. Finally, labor mobility between sectors and regions tends to decrease
food production but also deforestation. The total impact of ethanol production on food pro-
duction is negative while there is an ambiguous impact on deforestation.
Keywords Deforestation · Ethanol · Food · Indirect impacts · Land use · Migration
JEL Classification Q11 · Q24 · Q42
1 Introduction
After initially being hailed as a promising climate-change-mitigation strategy (Schneider
and McCarl 2003; Pacala and Socolow 2004; Farrell et al. 2006), biofuels production has
since been implicated in driving up food prices and causing deforestation (e.g. Righelato
and Spracklen 2007; Fargione et al. 2008; Laurance 2007; Scharlemann and Laurance 2008;
S. Andrade de Sá (B) · S. Engel
Environmental Policy and Economics, Institute for Environmental Decisions at ETH Zürich,
Universitätstrasse 16, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland
e-mail: saraly.andrade@env.ethz.ch
C. Palmer
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, London, UK
123
2 S. Andrade de Sá et al.
Tilman et al. 2009). Despite fears about these possible negative effects, expansion of biofuels
production continues apace (Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007).
Biofuels production is currently dominated by ethanol, most of which is produced by the
US (maize) and Brazil (sugarcane) (IEA 2007).1 Global ethanol production is predicted to
rise from around 60 billion liters in 2008 to 150 billion liters by 2018 (OECD and FAO
2009). Producers’ efforts to increase supply are based on expectations of future demand,
provoked by higher fossil fuel prices, growing mandates for blending biofuels in fossil fuels
used for transportation,2 and the recent commercialization of Flex-Fuel Vehicles.3 Yet, with
carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation and forest degradation accounting for up to one
fifth of global emissions of carbon dioxide (van der Werf et al. 2009), is clear that evidence
linking ethanol production to deforestation would considerably decrease its attractiveness as
a climate strategy. Current evidence, e.g. using life-cycle analysis, is not clear-cut and subject
to ongoing research and analysis.
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the possible social and environmental effects
of ethanol production by investigating the impacts of production on land use, deforestation
and food production, at the level of a national economy. A two-sector-two-input-two-region
partial equilibrium model is developed to map out and hence, better understand the channels
through which ethanol production influences the allocation of land and a mobile input, labor,
for agricultural production.4 Three channels are isolated, two involving the land market and
one involving the labor market. While Brazil, with its forest stock and prominent ethanol
sector, is an obvious candidate for illustrating at least two of these channels and related policy
implications, we show how our model may also be relevant for other countries.
Land is a limited resource allocated among different rival uses. In competitive equilibrium,
this allocation is such that the marginal net benefits of each use equate. If, for any reason, one
of these uses becomes relatively more profitable it will be allocated more land at the expense
of other uses in the same region. At the forest frontier, this direct land competition may entail
deforestation (e.g. Angelsen 1999, 2007; Barbier 2001). Energy crops for ethanol production
can directly compete with forests for land (Chakravorty et al. 2008). If production becomes
more profitable then this increases incentives to clear forest for energy crops. Although this
argument applies when energy crops used for ethanol production are grown in forest frontier
regions, it is far from obvious that it would still apply if energy crops are grown in regions
where forest is not present. For instance, Brazilian sugarcane producers in the state of São
Paulo, far from the Amazon region, claim that expansion would have no effect on patterns
of deforestation in the latter region (see Goldemberg and Guardabassi 2009). Yet evidence
has begun to emerge suggesting that sugarcane production in the past may have displaced
the production of other agricultural commodities from São Paulo to the Amazon (see Barona
et al. 2010).
This is a type of “indirect” impact of ethanol production. It is more precisely defined as
the conversion of forests and grassland to new cropland in order to replace the grain (or
cropland) diverted to biofuels (e.g. Searchinger et al. 2008; Gallagher 2008; Keeney and
Hertel 2009). We term this a displacement, which can occur either in the same country or in
other countries. Intuitively, indirect land use changes can be understood as a kind of spillover
1 First generation biofuels are divided into ethanol and biodiesel. Other producers of ethanol include Argentina,
South Africa and India.
2 Countries with such mandates include Brazil, Canada, India, China and the United States, among others.
3 Flex-Fuel Vehicles are able to run with any blending of gasoline and ethanol.
4 Since we are mainly interested in the impacts of ethanol production on land use and deforestation, we
abstract from the industrial process of ethanol production and focus on the rural economy, i.e. the feedstock
sector.
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effect. In this paper, we adopt a similar definition, although focusing on changes occurring
within a given country. Thus, an expansion in the energy crop is indirectly affecting a given
alternative land use (e.g. forests) so long as the former is grown in a region where the latter
is completely absent. By contrast, an effect is direct if the energy crop and alternative land
use are located in the same region.
Searchinger et al. (2008) utilize a partial equilibrium computable model of agricultural
markets to quantify the increased demand for land arising from US corn ethanol targets. This
study shows the possibility of forests being converted to replace cropland diverted to corn
production. It concludes that US corn ethanol has a negative net effect in terms of greenhouse
gases savings compared to fossil fuels when emissions from indirect land-use changes are
taken into account. While some drawbacks to the methodology used have been identified
(see Gallagher 2008), this study is the first to take into account the possible indirect effects
of ethanol production. Nevertheless, the market mechanisms underlying this effect remain
unclear, although Feng and Babcock (2010) go some way towards clarifying these. Using
a partial equilibrium framework, they investigate how US policies to promote corn ethanol
production affect total cropland area and its allocation among different land uses. An increase
in the ethanol price is shown to increase the total cropland area by increasing the returns on
marginal land previously fallow. This gives incentives to producers to convert this land to
agriculture including both corn and other crops. Feng and Babcock do not, however, include
forests in their model and hence, do not explicitly model how ethanol demand might impact
on forest conversion.
A second possible indirect effect of increasing ethanol production is that of changes in the
demand for labor. Although expanding biofuels production has been promoted as a means
of increasing rural employment possibilities (e.g. von Braun and Pachauri 2006; Ewing and
Msangi 2009), its possible impacts on labor demand have yet to be properly investigated.
Since off-farm employment opportunities have been shown to decrease incentives for poor
rural agents to migrate to the forest frontier, (e.g. Bluffstone 1995; Shively and Pagiola 2004)5
we argue that better agricultural employment opportunities in non-forest areas could poten-
tially yield similar results. Accordingly, there is evidence of energy crop sectors increasing
their demand for labor in recent years. For example, the Indian sugar industry employs up
to 45 million farmers (Gonsalves 2007). Estimates of direct employment associated with
sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil range from 500,000 to 1 million (FAO 2007), mostly
of lower-skilled migrant workers in rural areas (Dufey 2008). Smaller producers such as
Tanzania and Venezuela are planning to expand production at least partially in the hope of
creating new rural jobs (see Pesket et al. 2007).
Biofuels production has also been implicated in having a negative impact on food produc-
tion through land competition and the diversion of crops from food to feedstock (FAO 2008).
The allocation of land away from food to the production of biofuels will, however, depend
on various factors, some of which exhibit a substantial degree of uncertainty, e.g. newer
generation biofuels may use land more efficiently than current technologies.6 Although we
focus primarily on how ethanol production might impact forest conversion, our framework
also allows us to consider how it may affect the output of food.
In this paper, we develop a model in which two final goods – an energy crop. 7 and a com-
posite good representing all other agricultural commodities (termed “food”)—are produced
5 Labor is typically included as an input to production when considering agricultural sectors and analyzing
deforestation (Angelsen 1999).
6 See Chakravorty et al. (2009) for a complete review of the fuel-food debate.
7 Some energy crops can also be used to produce food or other by-products than ethanol (e.g. sugarcane to
produce sugar). For simplicity, we assume that all the energy crop produced is devoted to ethanol production.
123
4 S. Andrade de Sá et al.
in two different regions. This set-up allows for the possibility of confining the production of
one good to a particular region due to region-dependent agro-ecological conditions. Varia-
tions in soil and climate often restrict the production of maize and sugarcane to certain regions
within a given country, for example, in Brazil, India and the US. We consider land and labor as
primary inputs to agricultural production in order to represent a partition between immobile
inputs and mobile ones. Moreover, we restrict attention to inputs supplied inelastically at the
national level.8 Land is immobile—or regionally inelastic—while labor is a relatively mobile
input, which is inelastic at the national level. This division between mobile and immobile
inputs allows us to define two market channels through which the direct and indirect effects
materialize. Finally, land type, i.e. land productivity, varies across the two regions, one of
which includes a forest. Property rights over the forest are considered ill-defined, resulting
in de facto open access.9
We show that ethanol production can impact deforestation and food production in three
distinct ways. First, there is the Direct Land Competition effect in which forest conversion is
increased while food production declines. Second, we characterize an Indirect Displacement
effect whereby an increase in ethanol prices reduces inputs available for food production thus
entailing a lower output. This lower output may affect food prices – as would be the case if
world prices were sensitive to the country’s food production – and trigger a displacement of
food production towards the forest frontier. Consequently, deforestation increases while total
food production decreases. Finally, a third indirect effect emerges which has neither been
explicitly considered nor modelled in previous studies, and relates to the sectors’ competition
for labor and to this factor’s mobility. This Labor Mobility effect decreases food production
but also deforestation by drawing potential migrants into the employ of the energy crop sector
if the latter is located in the non-forest region.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model while the
three effects are isolated and characterized in Sect.n 3. Finally, Sect. 4 discusses the results
and presents some policy implications before concluding.
2 The Model
We consider a partial equilibrium setting with two inputs, land and labor, which are used to
produce two different agricultural goods— food and an energy crop. There are two regions
differentiated by their land quality. Region 1 has land of better quality, e.g. for agricultural
production, than region 2. Forest is present in region 2 but not 1.10 The objective is to investi-
gate how markets allocate inputs to the two sectors— depending on output prices—and how
this allocation influences land use, forest conversion and food production.
In the following sub-sections, we describe the assumptions regarding the technology
and the institutions embodied in the model. These are used to establish and isolate three
Footnote 7 continued
Relaxing this assumption would not change the results obtained from the model (see Feng and Babcock 2010).
Additionally, we do not consider processing costs. Thus, the output price of the energy crop is equivalent to
the ethanol price.
8 Inputs with perfect supply elasticity, i.e. where national prices are given by world markets, are irrelevant
when considering national allocations. Given that land and labor are inelastically supplied at the national level,
adherence to the standard framework of Mas-Collel et al. (1995) enhances rather than it reduces the empirical
relevance of our analysis.
9 Ill-defined property rights, especially over forested land, are a common feature of developing and emerging
economies (see Feder and Feeney 1991).
10 Forest land is generally not very productive for agriculture (Chomitz and Thomas 2003).
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partial effects, which operate through different channels and rely on a number of distinct
assumptions. Isolating each effect clarifies these assumptions and therefore the contexts in
which they manifest. Combining them gives the total effect of a change in the energy crop
price on the allocation of inputs, and thus on deforestation. In the baseline framework the
three partial effects occur jointly.
2.1 Technology
Let X A and X B be the quantities of food and energy crop produced, respectively.
2.1.1 The Land Factor
The amount of land available in region 1 (R1) is fixed and is used by both sectors, such that
R1 = R1A + R1B , (1)
where R1i , i ∈ {A, B} , corresponds to the amount of land in region 1 used to produce Xi .
In region 2, besides the initial stock of land (R2), agents can obtain additional land through
forest conversion. Let RD2 denote the total land cleared by the two sectors, and R2i , i ∈ {A, B}
the amount of initial land in region 2 used to produce Xi . We denote by RD2i , i ∈ {A, B} ,
the quantity of deforested land used by each sector. Then, the total amount of land used for
agriculture in region 2 is
R2 = R2 + RD2 , (2)
with11 R2 = R2A + R2B and RD2 = RD2A + RD2B .
Producers face a cost depending on the amount of forest land they decide to clear. This
forest conversion cost is linear, given by cRD2i , i ∈ {A, B} , c > 0, where c denotes the unit
cost of forest conversion, i.e., the cost of allocating time and resources to deforest one unit
of land and prepare it for agriculture.12 Note that one might consider the marginal cost of
conversion to be increasing as deforestation and forest degradation moves beyond the initial
frontier. We assume, however, that forest conversion occurs as a final step in the process of
deforestation from forest to agriculture and thus always takes place at the frontier. Therefore,
we do not consider the marginal cost of deforestation to be increasing. Also, since our aim
is to investigate the direction of energy crop price effects on forest conversion we restrict
attention to interior solutions where there is still some forest to be cleared. Hence, although
deforestation prospects are finite, bounded by the initial size of the forest, we do not need to
specify this amount.
Finally, following Mas-Collel et al. (1995),13 the supplies of initial stocks of agricultural
land in the two regions (R1) and (R2) are assumed perfectly inelastic. Therefore, these stocks
are completely used by producers as long as their respective prices are non zero.
11 Note that (2), by defining deforestation as land of type 2 used in excess of the initial stock available, makes
clear that all the initially-available land will be used irrespective of the land price.
12 We do not consider here any social values of forests such as those relating to biodiversity or carbon stor-
age. Also, we assume that producers do not derive any private benefits from standing forests such that when
deciding to convert forest they only compare the cost of doing so, c, and the cost of renting land of type 2.
13 Mas-Collel et al. (1995) consider the case of a small, open economy, where inputs are traded solely within
the country. By assuming that consumers have no direct use of their inputs’ endowments, (land and labor in
our particular case), the total supply of factors is equal to the total endowments so long as prices are strictly
positive.
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2.1.2 The Labor Factor
The economy’s total labor endowment is denoted L and its supply is perfectly inelastic (ibid).
In the following and for reasons given below, we alternatively assume labor to be perfectly
mobile or perfectly immobile across regions 1 and 2. Let L1i , i ∈ {A, B} , be the quantities
of labor used by sector i in region 1 and L2i , i ∈ {A, B} , the equivalent for region 2. Then,
if labor is perfectly mobile the constraint over the use of this input can be written as
L = L1 + L2 = L1A + L1B + L2A + L2B , (A.1)
where only the total amount of labor available for the two sectors is fixed. However, if labor
is perfectly immobile then the constraint writes
L = L1 + L2 with L1 = L1A + L1B and L2 = L2A + L2B , (A.1)
where the upper bar denotes a fixed quantity. Note that under (A.1) where labor mobility is
constrained across regions, labor can still freely move from one sector to the other, within
the same region.
2.1.3 The Final Good Production
The output of each sector, Xi , i ∈ {A, B} , is produced according to
Xi = λi
[
(R1i )α(L1i )β + θi
(
R2i + RD2i
)α
(L2i )β
]
. (3)
Two parameters are important in this equation. First there is 0 ≤ θi < 1, which represents
the factors’ productivity difference between regions 1 and 2. Furthermore, we also include
a sector-specific total productivity index λi > 0, i = A, B. This parameter captures differ-
ences in the production process of the two goods.14 Moreover, the production function of
both sectors exhibits decreasing returns to scale: α + β < 1.
Finally, in (3) we assume that the energy crop is either produced in both regions or is
restricted to region 1. The former case is formalized by
θB > 0, (A.2)
while the latter implies
θB = 0. (A.2)
(A.2) is an interesting case for two reasons. First, restricting energy crop production to the
non-forested area allows us to investigate the potential indirect impacts of its expansion on
deforestation. Second, it could reflect cases where some energy crops can only be produced
using particular types or qualities of land, as described in the introduction.
2.2 Institutions
Sectors A and B are composed of price-taking agents. We denote by PA and PB the world
prices of food and the energy crop, respectively. 15
14 Therefore, production functions across sectors differ in two respects: total factors’ productivity and factors
productivity in region 2. In order to obtain tractable results, we only assume the production function to differ
in these respects.
15 Since we assume that all the energy crop is devoted to ethanol production, PB also represents the ethanol
price.
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Table 1 The three effects and the supporting assumptions
Effects Labor mobility θB Food price
General baseline case Perfect mobility (A.1) θB > 0 (A.2) Sensitive to X A (A.3)
Direct land competition No labor mobility (A.1) θB > 0 (A.2) Given (A.3)
Displacement No labor mobility (A.1) θB = 0 (A.2) Sensitive to X A (A.3)
Labor mobility Perfect mobility (A.1) θB = 0 (A.2) Given (A.3)
The objective of Sect. 3 is to undertake comparative statics on PB and to decompose the
effect of this price change. Hence, we assume the ethanol price to be exogenously given.
However, we might be interested in potential reactions of the world price PA to changes in
national production as would be the case for a major food-producing country. Let us consider
the assumption that PA is sensitive to X A. In this case, it is given by
PA = (X A)−(1/ηA), (A.3)
where
1
ηA
is the elasticity of the world price PA to national production X A.16 Alternatively,
we might consider that PA is insensitive to changes in X A, as might occur if our economy
were a minor food producer, entailing
PA = PA. (A.3)
Also, there is a land market for each region with P1 and P2 denoting the regional land-
rental prices. Regarding the labor market, we consider a national labor market where labor
is assumed mobile with wage denoted W . If labor is immobile, then there are two regional
markets with wages denoted by W1 and W2, respectively. In equilibrium, note that wages
may vary across regions but not across sectors within the same region.
2.3 Road-Map
As outlined, an increase in the energy crop price, PB , will trigger three different effects. In
the baseline case, defined by (A.1), ( A.2) and (A.3), these effects operate simultaneously thus
giving the net effect of a change in PB on food production and deforestation. Our objective
is to decompose this total effect in order to understand the mechanisms behind each of the
partial effects. We do so by assuming successively but in an isolated manner (A.1), (A.2 ) and
(A.3). To clarify this, we briefly summarize our approach in Table 1.
First, we consider the Direct Land Competition effect, which implies direct competition
for land between the possible land uses. We therefore set θB > 0 (A.2) such that the energy
crop is grown in the forest region. In order to isolate it from the two other effects, we fix the
channels through which they operate, i.e. the mobility of the labor factor and the food price.
This implies a need to assume (A.1) and (A.3). Hence, the Direct Land Competition effect
should be understood as the effect of an increase in the energy crop price if energy crop and
forests compete for land for a given food price and supply of labor available at the forest
frontier. We investigate the two other partial effects in a similar fashion.
We discuss the implications of the assumptions that have been made so as to isolate each
effect in the following section.
16 Accordingly, ηA is the price elasticity of the country’s world’s residual demand.
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3 The Decentralized Equilibrium
In this section we first derive factor demands, quantities produced and the amount of defor-
estation in equilibrium. We then proceed to analyze the three partial effects of an increase in
the ethanol price PB on food production and deforestation.
The profit of sector i ∈ {A, B} is given by i = Pi Xi − W1L1i − W2 L2i − P1 R1i −
P2 R2i − cRD2i .
Applying (3), profits can be rewritten as
i = Pi
{
λi
[
(R1i )α(L1i )β + θi
(
R2i + RD2i
)α
(L2i )β
]}
−W1L1 − W2 L2 − P1 R1i − P2 R2i − cRD2i .
After rearrangement, the first-order conditions for the choice of profit-maximizing input
quantities R1i , L1i , R2i , L2i and RD2i , in an interior solution write
R1i =
(
P1
αλi Pi
)1/(α−1)
(L1i )β/(1−α), (4)
L1i =
(
W1
βλi Pi
)1/(β−1)
(R1i )α/(1−β), (5)
R2i + RD2i =
(
P2
αλi Piθi
)1/(α−1)
(L2i )β/(1−α), (6)
L2i =
(
W2
βλi Piθi
)1/(β−1) (
R2i + RD2i
)α/(1−β)
, (7)
and
R2i + RD2i =
(
c
αλi Piθi
)1/(α−1)
(L2i )β/(1−α). (8)
Note that from (6) and (8) an interior solution requires P2 = c at equilibrium. This means
that the marginal cost of deforestation, given by c, must be equal to the market rental price of
land in region 2. By focusing on interior solutions, we are ruling out the two cases c = 0 and
c → +∞.17 This is due to our objective of better understanding how producing energy crops
might influence deforestation. Thus, restricting attention to interior solutions were defores-
tation is positive although not extreme (i.e. where the forest is completely cleared) allows
us to avoid uninteresting cases where deforestation is insensitive to changes in energy crop
production.
3.1 Case 1: The Direct Land Competition effect
To illustrate the direct effect of ethanol production on deforestation, we assume a fixed stock
of labor in each region (A.1). By excluding labor mobility we want to highlight the impact
17 c = 0 would imply a corner solution where producers only use deforested land. One argument to abstract
from this case is that although forest conversion may actually be a cheap way of obtaining land for agriculture,
it still requires some effort (labor) and time to convert land. It is then reasonable to assume that c > 0.
c → +∞ would imply that there is no forest conversion at all. This case can arise in contexts where property
rights over the forest are fully defined and enforced. It nonetheless contradicts our assumption of vulnerable
forests. Similarly, if all the forest stock has been converted to agricultural land no more deforestation is possi-
ble, which is equivalent to having c → +∞. The total amount of land of type 2 available for agriculture then
becomes totally fixed.
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of using land to produce ethanol both on food production and deforestation. Moreover, we
assume that both sectors A and B use land in the two regions (A.2). Finally, we consider the
price of food PA to be fixed (A.3).
3.1.1 The Equilibrium Land and Labor Allocations
From the first order conditions (4) to (8), one can compute the input demand functions (see
Appendix A). Together with inelastic supplies of land and labor, these demand functions give
the equilibrium input prices (see Appendix B) and the equilibrium input quantities below:
(R1i )e = R1
1 +
(
λ j Pj
λi Pi
)1/ν , (9)
(L1i )e = L1
1 +
(
λ j Pj
λi Pi
)1/ν , (10)
(
R2i + RD2i
)e =
(α
c
)1/(1−α) [ L2
(λi Piθi )1/ν + (λ j Pjθ j )1/ν
]β/(1−α)
(λi Piθi )1/ν (11)
and
(L2i )e = L2
1 +
(
λ j Pjθ j
λi Piθi
)1/ν , (12)
where i, j ∈ {A, B} , i = j and ν = 1 − α − β > 0.
From (11) and RD2 =
(
R2A + RD2A
) + (R2B + RD2B
) − R2 , the equilibrium amount of
converted forest is given by
(
RD2
)e =
(α
c
)1/(1−α) (
L2
)β/(1−α) [
(λA PAθA)1/ν + (λB PBθB)1/ν
]ν/(1−α) − R2. (13)
3.1.2 The Direct Land Competition Effect
The following proposition states the effect of an increase in the ethanol price on deforestation
for case 1.
Proposition 1 Without labor mobility and for a given food price PA, deforestation is increas-
ing in the ethanol price PB, as long as θB > 0.
Proof See Appendix C unionsq.
The Direct Land Competition effect stems from land reallocation between rival uses in
region 2. In equilibrium, an increase in PB entails a reallocation of land in favor of the energy
crop sector at the expense of both forest and sector A. This effect on forest conversion clearly
relies on the fact that the energy crop is grown at the forest frontier (θB > 0). It is therefore
a direct effect following the definition given in the introduction. Otherwise, i.e. if θB = 0,
the equilibrium amount of deforestation given by equation (13) would be independent of
the ethanol price PB . This result is standard and in line with theory explaining land-use
changes by variations in marginal rents of competing land uses (e.g. Angelsen 1999). While
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not illustrative of ethanol production in Brazil say, this effect has been most clearly observed
in Indonesia, for example, where forest has been directly converted to palm oil (Fargione
et al. 2008).
The reallocation of inputs in region 2 also occurs at the expense of the food sector. This
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Without labor mobility and for a given food price PA, food production is
decreasing in ethanol price PB.
Proof See Appendix D unionsq.
This second result establishes the rationale for fuel-food competition and is also in line
with the previous literature on land competition among rival uses.
3.2 Case 2: The Displacement Effect
Similar to the Direct Land Competition effect, the Displacement effect materializes through
the land market. To isolate this effect, we maintain the assumption regarding labor immo-
bility (A.1). Also, we set θB = 0 such that energy crop production is restricted to region
1 (A.2), and use this to control for the Direct Land Competition effect. Finally, although
competitive agents remain price takers, we now consider that the total quantity X A produced
in the country affects the world price PA (A.3): PA = (X A)−(1/ηA).
The equilibrium amount of inputs used by the two sectors in region 1 are the same as pre-
sented in Sect. 3.1, i.e. they are given by equations (9) and (10). Since sector B is restricted
to region 1 it does not employ any labor in region 2. The equilibrium amount of labor for
sector A in region 2 is thus given by L2A = L2. Similar reasoning applies for land of type 2
such that R2A = R2.
In equilibrium, the amount of good A produced is determined according to
X A =
(
R1
)α (L1
)β
[
1 +
(
λB PB
λA PA
)1/ν]α+β + (θA)
1/(1−α)
(
αλA PA
c
)α/(1−α) (
L2
)β/(1−α)
, (14)
where, unlike in Case 1 and according to (A.3), PA = (X A)−(1/ηA).
(14) and (A.3) give the effect of an increase in the ethanol price PB on the food price PA
and on food quantity X A. As we shall see in Proposition 4, PB negatively affects X A. It thus
positively affects PA. Using (13) and θB = 0 (A.2), the total amount of land conversion in
this case is given by
RD2 = RD2A =
(
αλA PAθA
c
)1/(1−α) (
L2
)β/(1−α) − (R2
) (15)
which only depends on PA. Therefore we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector PA is sensi-
tive to quantity X A, then an increase in the world ethanol price increases deforestation even
if the energy crop and the forest are grown in different regions.
Proof See Appendix E unionsq.
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In this second case, sectors B and A only compete for inputs in region 1 where an increase
in the energy crop price expands the former at the expense of the latter. Even after taking
into account sector A’s production in region 2, this decreases total national production X A,
thus leading to a higher PA, from (A.3). However, in region 2, this effect increases the food
sector demand for inputs and as a consequence, deforestation. We term this the Displacement
effect, which means that increasing marginal profitability of the energy crop may induce a
displacement of other agricultural activities towards the forest frontier.
This result holds if and only if the quantity X A produced in the national economy affects
the world food price PA. This can be the case either if the national economy under study is
a major food producer or if X A is only traded within the national economy. The former case
can be seen, for example, in India which is currently the world’s second-largest producer of
sugarcane—and with plans to rapidly expand ethanol production—as well as an important
rice producer.18 Similarly, Brazil was responsible for approximately 25 percent of global
soya production, in 2008. The latter case is generally the case for locally-produced staple
food crops in many developing economies.
The influence of X A on PA also depends on how elastic (or inelastic) food demand is, i.e.
on the category of food products the national economy is producing. This effect is magnified
in the case of staple foods, for which demand—either residual world demand or national
demand—tends to be inelastic (Fafchamps 1992).
The following proposition summarizes the effect of an energy crop price increase on
national food production.
Proposition 4 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector PA is sensi-
tive to quantity X A, then an increase in world ethanol price PB decreases the total quantity
X A produced in the country.
Proof See Appendix F unionsq.
Although X A decreases, by proposition 3 the decrease in the amount of food produced—
is dampened by the possibility of creating new agricultural land through forest conversion.
As compared to the case where PA is fixed, consumers of food are therefore less affected by
the increase in ethanol demand, although new food production will occur at the cost of the
environment. This particular point can have implications in terms of policy choice. Indeed, it
suggests a trade-off between poor households’ food security and environmental protection.
More precisely, in our setting, if policy makers opt for higher forest protection,19 this will
increase the cost of forest conversion. In turn, this diminishes the forest’s ability to act as a
buffer for the food price increase subsequent to an increase in the ethanol price. Higher food
prices will consequently increase poor households’ vulnerability. On the other hand, leaving
the forests unprotected—so that they can be converted to cropland and thus mitigate the food
price increase—implies potential environmental damages such as diminished carbon storage
capacity and biodiversity losses.
3.3 Case 3: The Labor Mobility Effect
In this case, we aim at better understanding how ethanol production may affect deforestation
and the food sector through the labor market. By introducing labor mobility (A.1), we show
18 In 2008, India produced 22 percent of global rice output. See: http://www.faostat.fao.org.
19 For example, by providing positive incentives such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES) to agents
such that they keep land in forest rather than convert forest to agriculture (see Engel et al. 2008).
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that the quantity of labor used by activities in region 1 has an influence on the amount of
labor available for activities in region 2 and hence, on the amount of forest clearing. In order
to isolate this effect, we again set θB = 0 (A.2)—such that sector B is only present in region
1.20—and consider PA to be insensitive to quantity X A (A.3). Finally, by (A.1), there is a
single wage in both regions denoted by W .
Using (4) to (8), θB = 0, P2 = c and W1 = W2 = W we derive the demand functions
of land and labor for both sectors A and B (see Appendix G). In particular, the demand for
deforested land by sector A in region 2 is given by
RD2 =
(α
c
)(1−β)/ν ( β
W
)β/ν
(λA PAθA)1/ν − R2
which negatively depends on the wage level. Moreover, using the input demand functions of
both sectors and inelastic supplies of land and labor.21 we can establish an implicit positive
relation between PB and W , given by
L =
(
β
W
)1/(1−β) [
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
]ν/(1−β) (R1
)α/(1−β)
+
(
β
W
)(1−α)/ν (α
c
)α/ν
(λAθA PA)1/ν .
The effect of an increase in the energy crop price PB on forest conversion is addressed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 With labor mobility, for a given food price PA and when ethanol is produced
in a region different from the forest frontier, deforestation in the forest region is decreasing
in the ethanol price PB.
Proof See Appendix G unionsq
Proposition 5 states that a higher ethanol price increases demand for labor in the ethanol
sector in region 1 thus increasing the wage. In region 2, since PA remains fixed, a higher
equilibrium wage lowers the potential for deforestation. Intuitively, increased labor demand
in region 1 provokes a shift in the labor force from sector A to sector B, which only operates
in region 1. We term this the Labor Mobility effect.
The idea that the reallocation of labor might indirectly drive forest conversion could, in
principle, represent an argument for developing or expanding ethanol production in regions
far from the forest frontier. Our framework indicates, furthermore, that increasing biofuels
production may have the potential to lower the incentives for migration towards forest regions
hence reducing pressure on forests. Qualitative case studies suggest that this effect is a pos-
sibility. For instance, Moraes and Alves (2008) investigate working conditions in São Paulo
sugarcane plantations, in the Center and South of Brazil. They describe the flows of tempo-
rary migrants from Maranhão and Piauí states in the Northeast. These migrants are mainly
landless people and small farmers who have been identified as key deforestation actors in the
Brazilian Amazon (Fearnside 2008). Thus, there is evidence for the existence of migration
flows originating in the Northeast, and gravitating either towards the forest frontier or the
sugarcane plantations around São Paulo. Although these movements would need to be inves-
tigated and tested empirically, the two migration destinations could be seen as substitutes
20 This implies, as in case 2, that R2A = R2, RD2A = RD2 and L2A = L2.
21 See Appendix G for details.
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since they meet the same need, i.e. a desire to improve livelihoods. In this case, an increase
in the intensity of the flow towards the South—say due to higher labor demand in sugarcane
plantations—could in theory decrease migration towards the forest frontier.
The effect stated in proposition 5 is mainly driven by the assumption of perfect inelastic-
ity in total labor supply. Had we assumed perfect elasticity of supply in the factors’ markets
then the factors’ prices would have been given exogenously in the model. This would have
implied that an increase in the energy crop price, even if increasing this sector’s labor demand,
would not affect wages. Therefore, the labor supply available for the food sector would not
decline,22 implying no effect on deforestation. In reality, labor supply to agriculture is likely
to be somewhere in between these two polar cases, i.e. is finitely-elastic. Nevertheless, we
believe that labor effects in rural areas of developing countries should not be underestimated
given evidence of the continuing importance of agriculture for employment and livelihoods.
For instance, in India, 52 percent of the country’s total labor force in 2006 was employed
in agriculture.23 Also, according to the World Bank,24 agriculture accounted for almost 20
percent of total employment both in Brazil and Colombia in 2006. While these figures do not
completely justify the perfect inelasticity assumption, they corroborate the fact that demand
for labor in agriculture may be sufficiently important to affect wages, at least regionally. Addi-
tionally, the magnitude of the effect naturally depends on the degree of mobility between the
ethanol-producing region and the forested region.
Finally, note that if the food price were affected by quantity X A, then the Labor Mobility
effect would be coupled with a Displacement effect. In this case, although the Displacement
effect would tend to increase forest conversion, the Labor Mobility effect would go in the
opposite direction. The magnitude of this “compensation” will depend mainly on the influ-
ence of X A on PA, the influence of labor demand in the energy crop sector on agricultural
wages and the degree of mobility in the rural labor force. The stronger the impact of X A on
PA the more wages would have to increase and the more labor would have to be mobile in
order that the Labor Mobility effect can compensate the Displacement effect.
Turning to the effect of an increase in the energy crop price on national food production,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 With labor mobility and for a given food price PA, the quantity X A of good
A produced in the country is decreasing in the ethanol price PB.
Proof See Appendix H unionsq.
Again, the energy crop sector expands at the expense of the food sector. Therefore, PB
decreases national food production X A. In fact, additional to the increase in wage, a higher
ethanol price PB further decreases X A by reducing the equilibrium amount of land allocated
to sector A in this region. In (9) one can see that the equilibrium amount of land allocated
to sector A in region 1 is given by (R1A)e = R1
1+
(
λB PB
λA PA
)1/ν , which is decreasing in PB . As a
consequence, an increase in ethanol price has a combined effect through both the land and
the labor markets provoking a decrease in food production. Within region 1,the reallocation
22 This is because perfect elasticity of total labor supply implies that the total stock of labor available for the
two sectors is not fixed. This supposes that the sectors’ labor demand is too small to influence national wages.
23 See: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html#Econ.
24 See: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS.
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of inputs in favor of the energy crop sector is of a kind that is reminiscent of the Direct Land
Competition effect.
Finally, when both the Displacement and the Labor Mobility effects combine, national
food output is further affected by an increase in the energy crop price since deforestation will
play a smaller buffer role compared to the role played when considering the Displacement
effect without labor mobility.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of energy crop production on land
use, deforestation and food production with a partial equilibrium model of input allocation
between the energy crop and food sectors. The model incorporates two regions of which
only one contains forest. New land can be allocated to crop production via forest con-
version. Three partial effects are highlighted and analyzed separately. In this section, we
discuss the conditions under which each of the three effects materialize. In doing so, we
present some policy implications for the Displacement and Labor Mobility effects before
discussing how policy relates to the overall model approach. Policy implemented in the
Brazilian ethanol industry is used to illustrate our points. Table 2 below summarizes these
effects.
The Direct Land Competition effect (case 1) is the one that has been most investigated in
the literature (e.g. Angelsen 1999). Given a finite stock of land, the allocation of land to one
particular use can only be undertaken at the expense of other uses. If the relative marginal
profitability of the energy crop sector increases, e.g. due to an increase in the ethanol price,
a reallocation of land previously under rival land uses (food production and forest) in favor
of the energy crop sector occurs.
The possible existence of a Displacement effect (case 2) has also been discussed in the
literature through the notion of indirect land-use changes (e.g. Gallagher 2008; Searchinger
et al. 2008). There is also some empirical evidence for the displacement of other agricultural
activities from the South of Brazil towards the Amazon as a result of the expansion of sug-
arcane production (Barona et al. 2010). Thus, the increased profitability of one agricultural
sector has the potential to displace other agricultural activities towards marginal lands such
Table 2 Summary of conditions under which each effect occurs
Effects Assumptions Deforestation Food production
Direct land competition No labor mobility (A.1)
θB > 0 (A.2) – –
PA given (A.3)
Displacement No labor mobility (A.1)
θB = 0 (A.2) – –
PA reactive to X A ( A.3)
Labor mobility Labor mobility ( A.1)
θB = 0 (A.2) + –
PA given (A.3)
note:“+” denotes potentially increasing; “−” denotes potentially reducing
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as those under forest. Our results are in line with those of Feng and Babcock (2010), as
they relate to the impacts of an increase in the ethanol price on the food sector. Regarding
impacts on deforestation, we show that there are two necessary conditions for this effect to
be observed. First, the energy crop has to be produced, at least partially, in the non-forested
region,25 i.e. away from the forest frontier. Second, the displaced activity has to be such that
national production affects the output price. If this condition is not satisfied, then the price of
the potentially displaced good will not vary, leaving its profitability unchanged. Instead of a
displacement of production one would observe a simple direct reallocation of land between
the two activities.
Regarding the size of the displacement, it depends, among other factors, on how sensitive
the food price is to a decrease in quantities produced, expressed by the elasticity ηA. Note,
however, that the negative impact on the quantity of food produced is dampened by the pos-
sibility of new agricultural land emerging through deforestation. The increase in the food
price makes deforestation more profitable thus giving incentives to food producers to clear
more land, a trend commonly observed in forest frontier regions (Angelsen and Kaimowitz
1999; Barbier 2001). Newly-available land is converted to food production, which lowers
the food shortage induced by land conversion to energy crop production in the non-forest
region, subsequent to the increase in ethanol prices. This effect implies that governments
and decision makers keen to promote ethanol production should focus on developing policy
instruments to ensure that the displacement of food production is guided towards idle land. If
such land can be converted to food production at relatively low cost, e.g. by providing tech-
nical assistance or building infrastructure such as roads to reduce costs to market, this could
potentially mitigate food price increases while preventing deforestation. But, if little idle
land is available to mitigate the food price increase, our results suggest a trade-off between
increased food prices and forest protection, both having implications for social welfare. For
countries with little idle land, ethanol production should neither be considered a desirable
GHG-mitigation strategy nor a sustainable energy-producing strategy (see also, Ewing and
Msangi 2009).
The Labor Mobility effect (case 3) is the other novelty of the paper, and one which is
supported by evidence for increases in the flow of migrant labor towards sugarcane-growing
regions of Brazil from the Amazon (Moraes and Alves 2008). Of course, our model assump-
tions regarding labor—perfect mobility or total immobility—are extreme cases used to illus-
trate this effect. In reality, agents’ mobility is probably in between these two extremes and
will not depend solely on wages. Other factors include the availability and quality of infra-
structure, family ties and household composition, among others (Mincer 1978). Also, we
have assumed total labor supply to be perfectly inelastic. This is, of course, unlikely to be
the case in reality with the assumptions made in order to illustrate the effect in a tractable
manner. Nevertheless, our results imply that in a context where the forest frontier is a suitable
destination for poor rural households, an energy crop sector located in a non-forest region
may represent an alternative migration choice. This will particularly be the case when the
energy crop sector is labor intensive and offers higher wages compared to other agricultural
sectors. Conversely, a decrease in demand for labor in the energy crop sector could become an
additional factor incentivizing agents to migrate towards the forest frontier. This could occur,
for example, due to mechanization. For instance, the State of São Paulo, recently instituted
a law forbidding the burning of sugarcane fields before the harvest. Without intending to,
25 If the whole energy crop output is produced in the forest region then there is a Direct Land Competition
effect, i.e. the energy crop directly competes for land with forests but with no displacement of other agricultural
activities towards the forest frontier.
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this law implicitly increases incentives for mechanization, since manual harvesting without
previous burning is much less effective. Consequently, the sector’s demand for unskilled rural
labor, mainly employed in harvesting, is expected to decrease. Finally, an increase in labor
demand in the energy crop sector diverts labor away from the food sector thus decreasing food
production. Moreover, if the food price is sensitive to changes in national food production,
we would expect to see additional upward pressure on the food price.
Our results show that the overall impact of ethanol production on food production is
unambiguously negative: whether considering direct or indirect effects, increasing ethanol
demand drives down food output. The overall impact of ethanol production on forest con-
version, on the other hand, is ambiguous. In particular, when considering the indirect effects,
increasing ethanol demand can both increase deforestation through the land market and
reduce it via the labor market (where there is free movement of labor). Which effect domi-
nates is essentially an empirical question. Further ambiguities result from remaining uncer-
tainties regarding a number of parameters including the price elasticity of the food sector,
the size of the displacement effect, and the total land available for food and energy crops.
Thus, the relative importance of these parameters in determining overall impact implies a
need for empirical research on the impacts of ethanol production undertaken in a specific
context.
Throughout the paper, we have considered the impacts of an exogenous increase of the
energy crop price without considering the reasons for such an increase. In reality, this price
shift may be driven by several factors including national and international pro-biofuels
policies. These may include subsidies to production, the introduction of blending mandates
or even higher oil taxes. The main implications of such policies in relation to both welfare
impacts and land-use changes have already been discussed in previous studies (see, for exam-
ple, Feng and Babcock 2010; de Gorter and Just 2009). In our setting, what matters ultimately
is the output price faced by energy crop producers. Hence, all policies that favor the pro-
duction of energy crops can be decomposed into the three partial effects discussed above, if
the conditions supporting each of the effects are also met. As discussed, such policies were
applied, for instance, in Brazil during the PróAlcool program, launched after the 1970s oil
shocks to reduce the country’s energy dependency. By acting both on the supply side (through
low interest rates for loans to construct mills, and subsidized and regulated prices) and on
the demand side (by imposing blending mandates), the federal authorities created a national
market for ethanol. By the end of the program in the late-1990s, the conditions had been
established for it to operate without further public intervention.
Finally, we acknowledge that our model is only relevant for contexts where forest might
be vulnerable to deforestation, with weak property rights to forest land, and where crops can
only be grown under certain conditions. Thus, of the two current major producers of ethanol,
Brazil and the United States, our model is clearly more applicable to the former and not to
the latter. Nevertheless, it also captures the cross-border indirect effect of increasing demand
for US corn ethanol as demonstrated by Searchinger et al. (2008). More pertinently, there
are a number of countries and regions of the world where the ethanol sector is in the process
of being developed on a large scale. These include India and Colombia (see Lapola et al.
2009; Quintero et al. 2008), which have stocks of natural forest vulnerable to deforestation
and, along with Brazil, would form interesting case studies for further research. Such studies
could then be used to derive more concrete policy implications to show under what conditions
ethanol production could be expanded, while minimizing negative impacts on deforestation
and food production.
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Appendices
A The Input Demand Functions
We derive the sectors’ input demand functions in competitive equilibrium. They are obtained
by using (4) and (5), substituting one into the other and rearranging to get
R1i =
(
αλi Pi
P1
)(1−β)/ν (
βλi Pi
W1
)β/ν
(16)
and
L1i =
(
βλi Pi
W1
)(1−α)/ν (
αλi Pi
P1
)α/ν
. (17)
where ν = 1 − α − β > 0.26
In the same way, using (6) and (7), we obtain
R2i + RD2i =
[
αλi Piθi
P2
](1−β)/ν (
βλi Piθi
W2
)β/ν
(18)
and
L2i =
(
βλi Piθi
W2
)(1−α)/ν [
αλi Piθi
P2
]α/ν
. (19)
These equations express the quantity of inputs the two sectors demand in order to produce
a certain quantity Xi , given output price Pi . Also, using (18), R2 = R2A + R2B and RD2 =
RD2A + RD2B total forest conversion can be written as
RD2 =
(
α
P2
)(1−β)/ν (
β
W2
)β/ν [
(λA PAθA)1/ν + (λB PBθB)1/ν
] − R2. (20)
B The Equilibrium Prices
Replacing the demand functions derived above in the constraints R1A + R1B = R1, L1A +
L1B = L1, and L2A + L2B = L2 we obtain the input equilibrium prices
Pe1 = α
[
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
]ν ( 1
R1
)1−α (
L1
)β
,
W e1 = β
[
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
]ν ( 1
L1
)1−β (
R1
)α
and
W e2 = β
(α
c
)α/(1−α) [ (λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
L2
]ν/(1−α)
,
where e refers to equilibrium. Note that since we’ve assumed P2 = c, we do not need to
compute the equilibrium price for type 2 land.
26 ν > 0 follows from our assumption of decreasing returns to scale.
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C Proof of Proposition 1
Taking the derivative of (13) with respect to PB yields
∂(RD2 )
e
∂ PB
=
(
1
1−α
) (α
c
)1/(1−α)
(θB)
1/ν (λB PB)(α+β)/ν
[
L2
(λA PA)1/ν +(λB PB)1/ν
]β/(1−α)
,
which is positive, as long as θB > 0.
D Proof of Proposition 2
This proof is obtained by analyzing equations (9) and (11), where the amount of land allocated
to one use is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the other good’s price.
E Proof of Proposition 3
Taking into account the fact that PA is sensitive to quantity X A produced in the national
economy, we can replace it in (14) by X−ηAA . Rearranging we obtain
0 =
(
R1
)α (L1
)β
[
1 + (λB PB .λA XηAA
)1/ν]α+β
+ (θA)1/(1−α)
(
αλA
c
)α/(1−α) (
L2
)β/(1−α)
(
1
X A
)ηAα/(1−α) − X A.
This relation implicitly defines X A as a function of PB . An increase in PB decreases the
RHS of the expression. Since all the terms on the RHS are also decreasing in X A, in order
to reestablish the equality, X A has to decrease. Thus, X A decreases in the energy crop price,
which by (A.4) implies that PA increases in the energy crop price.
From (15) it is straightforward to see that the equilibrium amount of deforestation is
increasing in the price of food. Thus, an increase in PB induces an increase in PA, which in
turn increases forest conversion.
F Proof of Proposition 4
This has been shown when proving proposition 3.
G Proof of Proposition 5
In order to demonstrate the Labor Mobility effect we proceed in two steps. First, we show
that the wage level increases with the ethanol price before showing how deforestation varies
with the wage level. This represents an indirect effect of ethanol price on deforestation.
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Using (4) to (8), θB = 0, P2 = c and W1 = W2 = W one can derive the demand functions
of land and labor for both sectors B and A which are given by
R1B =
(
αλB PB
P1
)(1−β)/ν (
βλB PB
W
)β/ν
, (21)
L1B =
(
βλB PB
W
)(1−α)/ν (
αλB PB
P1
)α/ν
, (22)
R1A =
(
αλA PA
P1
)(1−β)/ν (
βλA PA
W
)β/ν
, (23)
L1A =
(
βλA PA
W
)(1−α)/ν (
αλA PA
P1
)α/ν
, (24)
R2 + RD2 =
(
αλA PAθA
P2
)(1−β)/ν (
βλA PAθA
W
)β/ν
(25)
and
L2 =
(
βλA PAθA
W
)(1−α)/ν (
αλA PAθA
P2
)α/ν
. (26)
Using equations (21), (23) and the constraint R1 = R1A + R1B , we obtain an equation
giving the price of land in region 1, P1, as a function of the wage W
P1 = α
(
β
W
)β/(1−β) [
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
R1
]ν/(1−β)
. (27)
Using the constraint L = L1A + L1B + L2A and equations (22), (24), (26) and (27) we
obtain the following expression
L =
(
β
W
)1/(1−β) [
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
]ν/(1−β) (R1
)α/(1−β)
+
(
β
W
)(1−α)/ν (
α
P2
)α/ν
(λAθA PA)1/ν . (28)
From equation (28) we can see that, ceteris paribus, if PB increases then W must increase
as well since P1 and P2 are given. Looking at equation (25 ) note that the amount of cleared
land decreases with wage. Thus, an increase in ethanol price provokes an increase in wage
because the sector demands more labor. This in turn decreases deforestation.
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H Proof of Proposition 6
Using equations (21) to (27) and replacing these in the production function yields:
X A =
(
R1
)α/(1−β)
(λA PA)β/ν
(
β
W
)β/(1−β)
[
1 +
(
λB PB
λA PA
)1/ν]α [
(λA PA)1/ν + (λB PB)1/ν
](α+β)/(1−β)
+
(
β
W
)β/ν (
α
P2
)α/ν
(λA PA)(α+β)/ν .
From the expression above, the quantity X A of good A produced is, ceteris paribus,
decreasing in the wage W . We have already seen that the wage is increasing in the ethanol
price PB (see Proof of Proposition 5 above). Thus, X A is decreasing in PB .
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